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Abstract 
The activity of translating is as old as the entire history of human civilization. Yet, according to some, it is 
only in the second half of the twentieth century that translation became the subject of a specific 
discipline, or, more correctly, that it became the subject of a broad field of interdisciplinary studies, from 
linguistics to semantics, from literary criticism to comparative literature, and, more recently, even 
philosophy itself. This is so to the extent that the first scholars of translation in France have even spoken 
of a tournant philosophique de la traduction [philosophical turn of translation].1 It is natural to look back 
and attempt to delineate a history of the ideas about translation elaborated in the remote and in the near 
past once the theme of translation has imposed itself in various ways in the arena of contemporary 
culture, and therefore to find important precursors and ancestors, even though their contribution was 
limited often either to fragments or to opinions expressed in the margins of works devoted to other 
subjects or to comments about their translations. 
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The activity of translating is as old as the entire history of human civilization. Yet, 
according to some, it is only in the second half of the twentieth century that translation 
became the subject of a specific discipline, or, more correctly, that it became the subject 
of a broad field of interdisciplinary studies, from linguistics to semantics, from literary 
criticism to comparative literature, and, more recently, even philosophy itself. This is so 
to the extent that the first scholars of translation in France have even spoken of a tournant 
philosophique de la traduction [philosophical turn of translation].1 It is natural to look 
back and attempt to delineate a history of the ideas about translation elaborated in the 
remote and in the near past once the theme of translation has imposed itself in various 
ways in the arena of contemporary culture, and therefore to find important precursors and 
ancestors, even though their contribution was limited often either to fragments or to 
opinions expressed in the margins of works devoted to other subjects or to comments 
about their translations. 
 
The beginnings of the history of ideas on translation in Western civilization date at least 
from the time of the ancient Romans, who were more attentive to the necessity and 
importance of translating than the Greeks. This history brings us to the early twentieth 
century, that is, when the subject of translation mentioned above ‘explodes.’ Two main 
‘official’ philosophers at that time, the two Dioscuric figures of Italian neo-idealism, 
Croce and Gentile, deal with the subject of translation in their short writings, though in a 
significant way. But there is another special philosopher who approaches translation in a 
very particular way, having become a philosopher in the exceptional context of the 
academia of political fights and Italian prisons, that is, Antonio Gramsci. 
 
1. According to George Steiner, author of one of the most significant and successful 
books on translation published in the second half of the Twentieth Century, Croce 
belongs to that small number of personalities who said something relevant on translation 
prior to the most recent period.2 Steiner distinguishes between a first, long period that 
goes from the Ancients to the early nineteenth century and which is characterized by an 
empirical approach to the problem of translation, and a second period that goes from 
Schleiermacher to the first half of the Twentieth Century, where considerations on 
translation are inserted in a wider context and include ideas on language [linguaggio] and 
on interpretation. 
 
                                                
1J.-R. Ladmiral, Traduire. Théorèmes pour la traduction. Paris: Gallimard, 1994,2nd edition, p.XIII. 
2George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1992, 2nd edition, p.249. 
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The theme of the untranslatability of works of art, as readers of Steiner will know since 
he uses the Italian intraducibilità, is what procured Croce a place in the gallery of these 
famous figures (which constitutes for Steiner the third period). These are the precursors 
of the current phase of the history of translation. However, the ‘untranslatable’ is a 
dialectical element pertaining rightfully to the field of translation theory. 
 
The untranslatability in principle of works of art is a very well known thesis of Croce’s 
The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General, where he 
develops his conception of art as intuition-expression, that is, as theoretical activity 
peculiar to the spirit. He distinguishes theoretical from logical activity and, to the extent 
that intuition-expression constitutes an inferior degree of cognitive activity. He 
distinguishes it, together with logic, from praxis, which, in turn, articulates itself also as 
economics and ethics. 
 
Artistic intuition-expression is unrepeatable in its continuously renewed creativity: 
Everything that is truly intuition or representation is also expression. That which is not 
brought before the mind as an object by expression is not intuition or representation, but 
sensation or something merely natural. The spirit only intuits by making, forming, 
expressing. Anyone who separates intuition from expression will never be able to put them 
together again.3 
 
Since the aesthetic fact as such exhausts itself entirely in the expressive elaboration of 
impressions, it does not have anything to do with any practical element. Croce takes this 
to the extent that even exteriorization of what is perceived by intuition as interior to a 
work of art subsisting in the material world (picture, statue, etc.) becomes something 
inessential.  
 
Moreover, expression is not divisible into modes and degrees. Accordingly, the whole 
traditional patrimony of rhetorical partitions is relegated to the arena of what is worthless 
under the viewpoint of philosophical aesthetics: 
 
[I]ndividual expressions are so many individuals, no one of which is comparable to any 
other save in that they all share the property of being expressions. To use the language 
[linguaggio] of the schools, expression is a species that does not act in its turn as a genus. 
What alters is impressions, the contents of expressions; each content is different from every 
other, because nothing repeats itself in the flow of life; and to the continual variation of 
these contents corresponds the irreducible variety of expressive forms, the aesthetic 
syntheses of impressions.4  
 
Croce is inserting as a corollary his thesis on the untranslatability of works of art.  
 
Every translation, in fact, insofar as it attempts to express anew what its singular 
expression has already found in the original, either creates a diverse work of art or is an 
imperfect expression of the original, resulting in something without aesthetic value and 
                                                
3Benedetto Croce, The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General, trans. Colin 
Lyas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp.8-9.   
4Croce, The Aesthetic, pp.75-6. 
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therefore having just the features of a comment, of a paraphrase, with more or less 
successful approximation of the original. 
 
This thesis is not new. It has famous predecessors. Staying within the Italian literary 
sphere, it would be enough to recall Dante’s Convivio. Translation of poetic language 
[linguaggio] shows the limits and difficulties that all the scholars have recognized and 
they have supplied various responses (still, this has not stopped anyone from translating, 
even from translating poetic works). Yet, Croce’s thesis of the impossibility of translation 
becomes a necessary element for the coherence of his philosophical system. The activity 
of translation as an empirical fact and the existence of translations count little in Croce’s 
philosophy which excludes as irrelevant to the aesthetic arena all that is exterior to 
spiritual intuition-expression: 
 
Every translation, in fact, either diminishes or spoils the original, or the translation creates 
an entirely new expression by putting the original expression back into the crucible and 
mixing it with the personal impressions of the one who calls himself the translator. In the 
former case the expression stays that same as it was originally, the other version being more 
or less inadequate, that is to say, not properly expression: in the latter case there will indeed 
be two expressions, but with two different contents. Ugly but faithful, or beautiful but 
faithless.5 
 
The Croce of The Aesthetic unfolds his thesis rigorously, attenuating only its most radical 
consequences when he affirms that: since individuals resembling each other are still 
different from each other, one may think of establishing in their resemblance the “relative 
possibility of translations.” “What one calls a good translation is an approximation, which 
has the value of an original work of art and which can stand on its own two feet.”6 
  
This Crocean framework focuses evidently on the necessity of stressing the uniqueness 
and singularity of every authentic expression. Croce confirms this assumption in the 
future. In another of his important texts – La Poesia (1936)7 – Croce, while holding on to 
the thesis maintained in his previous The Aesthetic, simultaneously grants the possibility 
of translatability under an aesthetic viewpoint without any reserve: “There is no doubt 
that the sphere in which translation takes place is that of prose expression, which is 
accomplished with symbols and signs. These signs, not only those used in mathematics, 
physics, and the other sciences, but also those used in philosophy and history, are 
interchangeable according to need.” Here Croce gives a definition of what translating 
means and links it clearly to the “equivalence of signs for reciprocal comprehension and 
                                                
5Croce, The Aesthetic, p.76. 
6Croce, The Aesthetic, p.81. Later in the text of The Aesthetic, in the chapter on ‘physical beauty’ of nature 
and art the verb ‘to translate’ recurs in a sense which is worthy noticing: ‘The complete process of aesthetic 
production can be symbolized in four stages, which are: a, impressions; b, expression or aesthetic spiritual 
synthesis; c, the hedonistic accompaniment or pleasure in the beautiful; d, translation of the aesthetic object 
into physical phenomena (sounds, tones, movements, combinations of colours and lines, etc.)  Anyone can 
see that the essence of the matter, the only thing that is properly aesthetic, and therefore real is b, which is 
nothing like any mere natural manifestation or construction which can be metaphorically called 
‘expression.’ (p.107). 
7 Translated into English as Benedetto Croce, Poetry and Literature, trans. Giovanni Gullace, Carbondale, 
Il.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981.   
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understanding.” True translation consists, in fact, only in “establishing equivalences 
among signs.” 8 
 
Therefore, only prose can be translated. Prose means here, for Croce, what does not 
pretend to have aesthetic value. That is, “prose which is merely prose” or prose taken 
according to its ‘prosaism” but which can have philosophical, scientific, historical or 
moral goals.9 When one can draw equivalences among different prosaic expressions 
considered according to their gnoseological content. This is possible not only between 
different languages [lingue] but also when we relate to ancient forms of our own 
language, which, in order to be understood, require a sort of translation. 
 
Although, for Croce, poetry is untranslatable, translation becomes necessary within the 
field of philosophy, of science, of technology, and of everything expressed through prose. 
Translating is further necessary for pedagogical reasons for anyone who studies the 
humanities and has not had the possibility or the will to learn the original language 
[lingua] in which the various texts have been written. In this specific case, it is necessary 
to have recourse to something which approximates true poetry. In some cases, these 
approximations acquire their own life and importance and turn into real works of art: 
They are precisely those ‘beautiful unfaithful’ translations which are new works of art. 
 
It is because of the unrepeatable individuality of expression that Croce considers reciting 
lines of a poem and interpreting theatrical drama as something other than authentic 
‘poetry’ that resonates in the soul. In these cases, when the results are aesthetically 
relevant, a different work of art may come to light whose subjects are the actors, but it is 
not the author who is being represented or interpreted. Croce’s radicalism is not afraid of 
creating paradox, if one considers that the words of epic or tragic poetry were designed to 
be recited, but this would introduce the theme of literary genres and therefore of the 
different forms of expression, which Croce has already condemned and pushed back to 
the dominion of exteriority. Moreover, as we know, what counts for Croce is the pure 
interior word: the external realization of a work in its material form is inessential, even in 
visual arts. In this way, Croce makes language [linguaggio] live in the arena of silence. 
Croce would be offering a suggestive reduction if he were dealing with a kind of silence 
from which every word moves away. But instead, this silence is the pure projection of the 
learned person’s silent reading practice which imposes itself on our literary civilization 
only at a certain moment (one may recall here Augustine’s observation in his Confessions 
regarding Ambrogio’s silent reading),10 although it assumes absolute normative value in 
Crocean idealism. 
 
It is worth noting another instructive Crocean observation, the comment on the statement 
according to which: “...we never read a poem without translating it into our own language 
[linguaggio]; nor do we understand and speak a foreign language [lingua] without by this 
                                                
8Croce, Poetry and Literature, p.114. 
9Croce, Poetry and Literature, p.115. 
10Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp.92-3. 
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very act, translating it into our own. But the facts attest to the contrary...”11 This happens 
because truly reading or speaking a foreign language implies the revival of its sounds 
and, within those sounds, of the imagines and concepts tied to them. To translate, instead, 
means always to introduce other sounds, other images, and other expressions, in other 
words, it means to create another language [linguaggio]. To translate from one language 
to another is a metaphorical way of speaking. To translate actually means to include the 
other’s thought in one’s own. Thanks to translating, understood in this way, one can think 
the same concept which has been previously thought by Plato or Aristotle: Thus, the 
present and the past identify each other as “eternal moments in the history of thought.”12 
 
Two theses, then, characterize Croce’s position: the first concerns the un-translatability of 
poetry, and the second concerns the perfect translatability of thought. The latter is less 
known but almost mirrors the first.  
 
Frankly, I have to say that these two theses are unacceptable: translation that implies the 
recognition of the otherness and its acceptance by the finitude of another existence is both 
negated at the level of intuition-expression, in the name of the irreducible otherness of 
every individuality, and negated at the level of thought to the extent that it is reabsorbed 
in the unity of the spirit, which identifies every particularity in the eternity of the 
universal. In a way that could also be suggestive, the double negation makes impossible a 
translating that operates in the arena of existential contingency. The phantom of perfect 
identity appears twice and with its paradoxes crushes the constitutive imperfection of 
translation — the only notion of translation that is truly accessible to humans. 
 
2. Croce’s distinction between poetry and prose — as well as art and philosophy —
necessarily lead to Gentile’s criticism of it insofar as it ended up allowing a sort of pacific 
coexistence between the possibility and impossibility of translation within the Crocean 
system of the ‘distincts.’ Gentile devotes the article, Il torto e il diritto delle traduzioni 
[The right and wrong of translations] (1920), published in the first issue of the new 
magazine, Rivista di Cultura, to the problem of translation. It came out almost twenty 
years after Croce’s The Aesthetic but before Croce’s volume of 1936. By that time, the 
whole framework of Croce and Gentile’s systems was consolidated so that Gentile’s 
points of agreement and disagreement are clearly expressed. 
 
Gentile’s thesis stems from the radicalization of the position expressed in Croce’s The 
Aesthetic, according to which not only it is impossible to translate works of art but also 
scientific and philosophical works, because there is no thought without language 
[linguaggio]: “no thought could be such without being the poetry of the thinker.”13 
Shortly after this, one can find a statement that comes back later in phenomenological 
writings: language is not an external dress, “it is not the dress but the body of thought.”14 
                                                
11Croce, Poetry and Literature, p.117.  [Jervolino notes that Gentile had made this same proposition in 
1920, but Croce ignores it here].  
12Croce, Poetry and Literature, p.118. 
13Reprinted in Giovanni Gentile, Frammenti di estetica e di letteratura, Lanciano: Carabba, but the 
Avvertenza is dated 20 November, 1920, see p.369. 
14Gentile, Frammenti, p.370. 
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Even though Gentile says this referring to philosophical terminology, he also refers to 
something which has more general value in relation to the whole context of his 
discussion. Gentile, in fact, quotes Humboldt, for whom language [lingua] is not ergon 
but energeia, and underlines the extent to which language’s concreteness is speaking. 
Language is not fact (i.e. an object of knowledge of the grammarian and glottologist) but 
action, like any spiritual form of life. Understood this way, language [lingua] is only 
singular. Therefore one can reach two opposed conclusions, which are like the two sides 
of a coin: we never translate because the only really existing thing is living language; we 
always translate because “true language, which resonates in the human soul, is never the 
same, not even when it occurs in two consecutive instances. It exists on condition that it 
transforms itself and as something continuously restless and alive.”15 
 
At this point, Gentile launches into a great apotheosis of translation and stresses 
something that Steiner would certainly appreciate (indeed, he cites the first line):  
Since, to translate is the condition of all thinking and learning... Still, one does not only 
translate — as it is said empirically speaking and so presupposing different languages 
[lingue] — from foreign into his own language, but one always translates even from his 
own into his own language; yet, not only from the language of past centuries and from 
those writers we read, but also from our most recent language… What is translating, 
concretely and not abstractly, when the translator is present and one can check what he 
does, if not an interpretation through which one shifts from one language to another 
because the translator knows both, that is, he has connected both in his spirit, and can shift 
from one to the other, like shifting from one side to the other of the same language: the one 
and only language truly existing for him; which is neither the first nor the second, but the 
ensemble of both in their relation and unity? Whoever translates starts thinking in a way in 
which the very way he thinks does not represent a stop, but is transformed itself, so that the 
translator keeps unfolding, clarifying and rendering more intimate and subjective what he 
started to think about at the beginning. Within this shift from one side to the other of his 
own thought, within his one and only language, takes place what, empirically speaking, is 
called translating, which is like shifting from one language to the other. Is not this what 
happens when we read what has been written in our own language either by someone else 
or by us?16 
 
In this way, the possibility or rather the necessity of translating without distinguishing 
poetry and prose, art and philosophy, is established. Or, as Gentile himself would rather 
say, the ‘right’ of the translator is established. The translator’s wrong stems, instead, from 
the prejudice of considering the work of the spirit like a thing or a fact. We read Dante 
and Goethe, and make them live again in ourselves. This does not concern the Dante who 
died in 1321, but the Dante living in us. The same goes for Goethe: the Goethe we read in 
German is ‘our Goethe.’ 
 
Gentile’s Philosophy of Art, the first edition of which dates back to 1931, develops what 
he had already said in his article of 1920 and proposes again its conclusion: “An Italian 
reader, too, must translate into his own language (the language he speaks today!) a poem 
written by another Italian six centuries ago. In addition, each of us must translate for 
                                                
15Gentile, Frammenti, p.373. 
16Gentile, Frammenti, pp.373-4. Regarding Steiner’s quotation of Gentile, see Steiner, p. 264. 
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ourselves the words we wrote yesterday.”17 This time the controversy with Benedetto 
Croce is made explicit: Gentile accuses Croce of not having freed himself from “the 
obsession of an esthetic reality outside the subject, which has been enclosed and sealed in 
the past.”18 
 
As one can see, Croce and Gentile’s solution to the aporia of translation proposes again 
the fundamental inspiration proper to their philosophical systems: on the one hand, 
Croce’s ‘philosophy of the distincts,’ on the other, Gentile’s unity of spiritual act. This 
confirms the theoretical relevance of the question of translation has for both, despite its 
apparent marginality. 
 
Particularly regarding Gentile’s solution, one can say that while attempting to provide the 
foundation for human translating activity, it ends up dissolving more than resolving this 
problem. The diversity of languages about which Humboldt was meditating is precisely 
what is lost in the Eraclitean flow of unique spiritual life. In this way, Gentile’s 
acquisition, which is implicit in the notion of language as the body of thought, is 
neutralized. The life Gentile evokes is more than human, and at the end it risks vanishing 
if it does not become even inhuman. Concrete life, in fact, is not only made of 
inextinguishable and multiform vivacity, it is also characterized by passivity, heaviness, 
opaqueness and repetition. Nonetheless, Gentile grasps something real, even though it is 
dressed in speculative wraps of actual idealism. 
 
Once again, the discoveries as well as the aporias and confusions of idealistic thought 
must be overturned in order to bring the dialectical movement back to the concreteness of 
the human condition. 
 
3. One can look for this overturning precisely in Gramsci’s thought. In Gramsci’s case as 
well, scholars have only recently clearly grasped the importance of the subject of 
translation.19 This appears now one of the most original motifs of his reflections and one 
of the reasons for his new relevance beyond the stereotypes which have obscured him as 
a thinker for a long time. He is much richer than the icon, though honored, that a certain 
tradition has transmitted to us. 
 
Gramsci was formed as a linguist in the school of Bartoli (who hoped that Gramsci would 
pursue a brilliant career as a scholar of the new linguistic science emerging at the 
beginnings of the Twentieth Century). He was an attentive and acute reader, though 
irregular because of his anomalous position – or, one should say, because he lacked a 
place in the world of intellectuals, of the varied and uneasy culture of his time, and 
particularly of the great Italian philosophy of the early Twentieth Century. In his 
                                                
17 Giovanni Gentile, The Philosophy of Art, trans. and ed. by Giovanni Gullace (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press), pp. 217, translation altered. 
18Gentile, The Philosophy of Art, p. 217, n.2. Translation altered.   
19See André Tosel, Marx en italiques. Aux sources de la philosophie italienne contemporaine, Mauvezin: 
Trans Europe Repress, 1991. See also the more recent Giorgio Baratta, Le rose e i quaderni, Rome: 
Gamberetti, 2000, and Fabio Frosini, Gramsci e la filosofia, Rome: Carocci, 2003, pp. 98-102. On Gramsci 
and philosophy of language one cannot forget the study by Franco Lo Piparo, Lingua intellettuali egemonia 
in Gramsci, Bari: Laterza, 1979. 
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necessarily fragmented and unfinished work, Gramsci elaborates an original recovery of 
Marxism, which he frees from naturalistic and economistic dogmatism, and places again 
in the grand currents of historical life and struggle for the problematic, very difficult, 
though irrevocable, process of human liberation.   
 
In this context, Gramsci is not just using the phrase the ‘philosophy of praxis’ simply due 
to the caution of a prisoner [worried about fascist censors]. It has, instead, a peculiar 
theoretical meaning as documented by detailed philological inquiries. Praxis is the truth 
of Marx and Marxism. Marx’s thought is philosophy even though it breaks radically from 
past philosophy. It is not mere methodology. Regarding this point Gentile was right with 
respect to Croce’s position. One should not forget, in fact, that whereas Gramsci has 
debts towards neo-idealistic philosophy, the latter, in turn, especially with reference to its 
main representatives’ juvenile exordium, confronted Marx and had also its theoretical 
debts towards his thought. 
  
Now, there is a very strict tie between praxis and translation as Gramsci conceives it. He 
seems to overlook the Crocean question about the translation of works of art and also that 
of inter-linguistic translation (to use Jacobson’s terminology), even though one should 
not forget that some of his Prison Notebooks were devoted to translation exercises. 
 
However, Gramsci deals with this problem at a different level, that of the ‘translatability’ 
of languages [linguaggi]. He deals not much with historically defined languages [lingue], 
but rather with those linguistic-cultural ensembles proper to specific disciplines, to world-
views, and to particular cognitive universes. In this way, he recovers a problem which in 
the Marxist tradition corresponds to that of the so-called ‘superstructures.’ The theme of 
superstructures had been central to Italian Marxism and to the impact it had on the new 
generation of bourgeois intellectuals at the end of the nineteenth century. Gramsci’s 
position is not that of the impossibility of translating (poetry) but that “we always 
translate, when we talk, when we think” (and that for Croce is limited to philosophy and 
for Gentile is extended to all of spiritual life). Still, the key of this universal interpreting-
translating is not and cannot any longer be, for Gramsci, the philosophy of the spirit or of 
the act through which the spirit eternally recreates itself, but the new philosophy of 
praxis. All the secrets of cultural production are in historical and social praxis, and the 
Marxian philosophy of praxis is the one which knows how to read its own historical truth. 
 
In this way, Gramsci goes beyond Croce and Gentile and gets close to that rediscovery of 
hermeneutics realized in the 1920s in the arena of existentialist philosophies. This also 
could have been absorbed by Russian revolutionary Marxism had it paid attention to the 
cultural vanguards which sided with the Revolution. But instead Marxism closed itself by 
accepting a sort of naturalistic and positivistic dogmatism that rejected, was suspicious of 
and even persecuted these cultural movements including eliminating them physically 
during Stalin’s period. 
 
Concerning the philosophical field, I am thinking of the promising phenomenological 
school of Moscow, revolving around the activity of the young Professor Gustav Špet, 
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among whose young disciples were Roman Jakobson and Boris Pasternak.20 I also have 
in mind the experience of literary and artistic vanguards’ activity taking place in those 
years. 
 
About all this, Gramsci, who was a detainee in fascist prisons, could know little or 
nothing. It is therefore extraordinary that he discovered hermeneutics, in his own original 
way, through overturning neo-idealistic Italian philosophy. Gramsci had a first hand 
knowledge of contemporary studies on language, which dates back to when he was a 
university student. This was around the eve of the linguistic turn of twentieth century 
philosophy, which fully came to be during Gramsci’s incarceration, and lasted throughout 
much of the century. 
 
The hints one can find in Gramsci’s work of Bréal, Vailati, Russell, and Peano (the latter 
was teaching in Turin while Gramsci was university student there) have all the vivacity 
and fascination of a period in which — so to say — the game was not over yet. 
 
Gramsci conceives language [linguaggio] in a very broad sense, which becomes 
fundamental to his conception of history:  
It seems that one can say ‘language’ is essentially a collective term which does not 
presuppose any ‘unique’ thing neither in time nor in space. Language also means (even 
though at the level of common sense) culture and philosophy ... it may be said that every 
speaking being has her own personal language, at the least, i.e. her own way to think and 
feel.21 
 
Thus, translatability of languages means capability of establishing networks of 
connections and comprehension’s relationships between different cultures. Therefore, to 
know or not to know how to translate becomes decisive for the new type of intellectual 
promoted by Gramsci. It is no surprise that he tends to affirm — even if mitigated with a 
cautionary ‘it seems’ — that the primary or specific task of the philosophy of praxis is the 
accomplishment of the translatability of languages:  
The following problem must be resolved: whether the reciprocal translatability of the 
various philosophical and scientific languages is a ‘critical’ element that belongs to every 
conception of the world or whether it belongs (in an organic way) only to the philosophy of 
praxis, being appropriable only in part by other philosophies? […] It seems that one may in 
fact say that only in the philosophy of praxis is the ‘translation’ organic and thoroughgoing, 
whilst from other standpoints it is often a simple game of generic ‘schematisms.’”22 
 
However, this function of universal ‘translator’ is, for Gramsci, historically determined. 
The philosophy of praxis is historical itself and therefore destined to be overcome, 
whereas — as Gramsci himself explicates — some aspects of idealistic philosophies 
currently criticized could reveal their validity in the future, i.e., in a society different from 
                                                
20On this specific point I refer back to my article, “Phénoménologie herméneutique et marxisme critique,˝ 
Actuel Marx 25 (1999), pp.57-67. 
21Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere. 4 vols., ed. Gerratana, Turin: Einaudi, 1975, p.1330. Q10§44, p. 
1330.  English translation in Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin 
Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, New York: International Publishers, 1971, pp.348-9. 
22Gramsci, p.1468, Q11§47.  For translation see Antonio Gramsci, Further Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks, trans. Derek Boothman, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995, p. 307. 
Croce, Gentile and Gramsci on translation 
38 
the present one. In any case, we cannot forget the precarious and provisional character of 
Gramsci’s research, precisely because of the precarious and painful living conditions in 
which he unfolded it. What one has to keep of Gramsci’s research is, above all, the 
fruitful idea of a translatability that has to be pursued on the dangerous and difficult 
terrain of a praxis engaged in the construction of inter-human community worth its name, 
without any assurance of success.  
 
This idea, in its various forms dialectically connected to the idealist heritage, although it 
needs indeed to be translated again and again because of the finitude of existence, still 
remains for us a theoretical subject worthy of thinking about and an ethical-practical task 
in the ‘great and terrible’ world in which we happen to live and work.  
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